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Holly Kendall* 
 
Abstract: Ratification of the Rome Statute was a significant step in developing international 
rule of law. The International Criminal Court (ICC) now faces challenges in balancing its 
judicial character with maintaining the ongoing support of states. The contradictory outcomes 
in decisions on the admissibility of the cases against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-
Senussi raise questions about the relevance of access to legal representation for admissibility 
to the ICC. This paper argues that the purposes of the ICC require it to consider access to legal 
representation in its decisions on admissibility, that the Rome Statute permits its consideration 
and that the Court should take a pluralist approach that ensures that basic standards of access 
to legal representation are met while gradually developing higher standards of international 
criminal justice. In this sense, it could walk the tightrope between legitimacy and effectiveness. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Complementarity is a central element of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute)1 that was intended to balance state sovereignty against impunity.2 Complementarity 
means that if a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute an individual accused of an international 
crime, the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’ or ‘the Court’) may try the accused.3 The trials 
of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi have raised questions about whether 
access to legal representation should be considered in determining whether a state is unwilling 
or unable to try an accused. Prior to determinations of admissibility by the ICC neither Gaddafi 
nor Al-Senussi had access to legal representation for the domestic proceedings against them. 
The ICC held the case against Gaddafi admissible whereas the case against Al-Senussi was 
not.4 This paper considers the relevance of access to legal representation to admissibility of a 
case to the ICC. 
                                                 
*LLM University College London. I thank Dr Douglas Guilfoyle for his support and guidance and Nikolaos 
Pavlopoulos and Lea Raible for their helpful comments. 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 
UNTS 3 (Rome Statute). 
2 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’, United Nations 
General Assembly Official Records, Fiftieth Session (New York, 1995) UN Doc 22 A/50/22 (Ad Hoc 
Committee) para 37. 
3 Rome Statute (n 1) art 17. 
4 Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (admissibility of the case against Gaddafi) ICC-01/11/-01/11 (31 May 
2013) (Gaddafi Admissibility Decision) para 213; Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (admissibility of the case 
against Al-Senussi) ICC-01/11-01/11 OA 6 (24 July 2014) (Al-Senussi Admissibility Appeal Decision) para 180. 
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Section B addresses the theoretical aspects of the purpose of the ICC and how the provision 
of procedural justice is essential to fulfillment of its judicial function. Section C explores how 
the Rome Statute and its interpretation through the ICC implements theory in practice. It 
demonstrates that complementarity requires the Court to take into account the accused’s right 
to access legal representation, but that this must be done in a way that maintains the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the ICC. 
As an international legal institution, the ICC’s effectiveness is dependent not only on 
fulfilling its function of providing justice but also on maintaining the support of states. 
Considerations of effectiveness may influence the Court’s discretion. The ICC needs to be 
cognisant of the impact of the application of complementarity on the effectiveness of the Court 
and legitimacy of international criminal justice. Consideration of the accused’s right to access 
legal representation is essential to ensuring the legitimacy of the Court, but this must be 
balanced against the appearance of judicial imperialism and impeding the benefits of local 
justice. To maintain the integrity of international justice, the ICC must require a base level of 
access to legal representation for the accused in domestic proceedings that is accepting of 
different legal contexts. 5  This will allow for the development of higher standards of 
international criminal justice. 
 
B. THEORETICAL ASPECTS: THE PURPOSE OF THE ICC AND WHY IT 
MATTERS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE ACCUSED RIGHTS 
The preamble and context of the drafting of the Rome Statute suggest a range of purposes for 
the establishment of the ICC. The purposes of providing international justice and contributing 
to the rule of law, preventing impunity, deterrence, and establishment of a permanent court are 
relevant to whether the Court should consider the accused’s rights in determining admissibility. 
It is an inherent function of a court to provide justice. Access to legal representation is at 
the very least a safeguard of procedural justice. This section establishes how justice is relevant 
to the purpose of the ICC and, as a second step, why the Court’s purpose is relevant to 
procedural questions. 
1. Types of Justice 
International criminal justice attempts to implement various forms of justice. 
Relevantly these include retributive justice, justice for victims, denunciation, deterrence and 
                                                 
5 There is debate about the impact that the ICC has on domestic proceedings. This paper assumes that states will 
take some notice of ICC decisions. 
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procedural justice. Retributive justice seeks to punish those that have committed international 
crimes on the basis that the offenders deserve punishment for what they have done.6 Access to 
legal representation is relevant as it assists the Court to determine whether the individual has 
committed an offence, whether there is a defence, and whether there are any mitigating factors. 
Justice for victims seeks to recognise the harm to the individuals that have suffered and prevent 
vigilante justice. Given the magnitude and severity of international crimes, a failure to 
prosecute and convict can be seen as injustice by victims. Bringing international criminals to 
justice before the ICC also enhances denunciation and deterrence. To provide justice to victims, 
denunciation, and deterrence, procedural justice for the alleged perpetrator is crucial. 
Procedural justice protects the rights of the accused to ensure that the perpetrator is convicted 
rather than a scapegoat in a show trial. Justice for victims does not guarantee a conviction; it is 
a procedural guarantee enshrining that parties will be investigated and, where relevant, 
prosecuted. 7  Procedural justice seeks to ensure that the responsible party is prosecuted. 
Similarly, denunciation and deterrence are only effective if the Court prosecutes and convicts 
those that are responsible; otherwise, it will lack legitimacy and effectiveness as it will fail to 
provide any form of justice. Procedural justice is thus not only valuable for its own sake but 
also serves as a stepping stone for other types of justice. 
2. Purpose of the ICC 
a) International criminal justice 
International criminal justice is the provision of accountability and punishment for international 
crimes. The preamble of the Rome Statute affirms that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured…’. When a national jurisdiction prosecutes the accused for 
international crimes, they act as organs and on behalf of the international community 
irrespective of whether the act is also a domestic crime.8 Recognition that the prosecution of 
international crimes is carried out on behalf of the international community means that the 
obligations to investigate and prosecute in the Rome Statute are obligations owed to other 
states parties (and their people). This empowers the ICC ‘to assess the effective 
                                                 
6 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, CUP 2010) 
24. 
7 Luke Moffett, ‘Realising Justice for Victims Before the International Criminal Court’ (2014) 6 International 
Crimes Database Brief <http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/upload/documents/20140916T170017-
ICD%20Brief%20-%20Moffett.pdf> accessed 27 July 2015. 
8 Attorney-General of Israel v Eichmann, Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 1962, 36 ILR 277, 291,293; 
Paul JIM de Waart, Erik Denters and Nico Schrijver (eds), Reflections on International Law from the Low 
Countries: In Honour of Paul de Waart (Martinus Nijhoff 1998) 251; Jann K Kleffner, Complementarity in the 
Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (OUP 2008) 26. 
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implementation of this obligation as sole and ultimate arbiter’.9 In Tadić, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia held that ‘… the sovereign rights of [s]tates cannot and 
should not take precedence over the right of the international community to act appropriately 
…’.10 This should include the consideration of the accused’s rights. 
Heller objects that this is contrary to the intention of the Parties that did not wish for 
the ICC to carry out assessments of national judicial systems as evidenced by the travaux 
préparatoires.11 The Parties did not want the ICC to carry out assessments of a national judicial 
system, but addressed this issue in the drafting of Article 17 that limits the Court’s assessment 
to ‘the case’, ‘the proceedings’, or ‘in a particular case’.12 Any assessment of a specific case 
may lead to consideration of systemic factors.13 Further, Heller’s position fails to recognise 
the importance of maintaining the legitimacy of the international criminal justice system 
through symbolic validation. Symbolic validation refers to the reinforcement of the law’s 
authority by grounding it in the social order. In the case of the ICC, though not every 
perpetrator is prosecuted, its enforcement of international criminal law through judgments and 
sentencing, where necessary, reinforces the authority of international criminal law in the social 
order. Symbolic validation is important to legitimacy because it communicates authority and 
signals significance in the overall system of social order.14 The Prosecutor has supported the 
role of symbolic validation by stating that ‘it falls upon this Council and the international 
community to assist Libya to ensure that justice is not only done, but is seen to be effectively 
done’.15 If the ICC allows domestic courts, acting as international organs, to violate the rights 
of the accused it undermines the entire international criminal justice system as it replaces one 
kind of impunity with another.16 
                                                 
9  Federica Gioia, ‘State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and “Modern” International Law: The Principle of 
Complementarity in the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 19 LJIL 1095, 1100-1101. 
10 Prosecutor v Tadic (Jurisdiction) ICTY-94-1 (10 August 1995) para 42. 
11 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on 
National Due Process’ (2006) 17 Criminal Law Forum 281. 
12 Rome Statute (n 1) art 17. 
13 Prosecutor v Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (admissibility of the case against Al-Senussi) ICC-01/11/-01/11(11 
October 2013) (Al-Senussi Admissibility Decision) para 202 Separate opinion of Sung Hyun Song; Prosecutor v 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi (admissibility of the case against Gaddafi) ICC-01/11/-01/11 OA 4 (21 May 2014) 
(Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Decision) para 26; Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in 
International Criminal Law: Origin, Development, and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 166. 
14 Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP 1998) 30-41. 
15 ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, to the United Nations 
Security Council on the Situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’ (New York, 14 November 2013) 
<www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20st
atements/statement/Pages/Statement-UNSC-Nov2013.aspx> accessed 6 August 2014. 
16 Heller (n 11) 280. 
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In the final paragraph of the preamble to the Rome Statute, the states parties resolve ‘to 
guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice’. This reflects that if 
the purpose of the ICC was merely to prevent impunity ‘it would be a stimulus for show 
trials’.17 Damaška highlights that: 
[I]t would indeed be a disheartening irony if a justice system designed to contribute to 
the protection of human rights, could properly function only by disregarding 
humanistic values … If the perception were to spread that the courts stack the deck 
against the accused, this realization would in the long run be more harmful to 
legitimacy than sporadic acquittals. The courts’ constituencies, both global and local, 
might come to view them as administering only show trials and dispensing only second-
rate justice.18 
Just as national courts can be too eager to convict an accused, so can the ICC to shield 
itself from criticism of failing to prevent impunity. This was evident in the conviction of 
Katanga on the basis of a re-characterisation of facts that violated the accused’s right to be 
informed of the case against them.19 The credibility of the ICC is linked to its capacity to 
provide universal criminal justice without bias.20 This requires it to be publicly trusted to 
uphold the rule of law through credible application and impartial standards in a fair and 
consistent manner. 21 
b) International rule of law 
Though not explicit in the language of the Rome Statute, the establishment of an international 
court serves the purpose of establishing and upholding the rule of law.22 The Rome Statute and 
associated international law set forth in advance the applicable law in general terms. The Court 
seeks to impose restrictions on the exercise of power in accordance with law and apply the law 
equally to all parties.23 Nonetheless, referrals to the ICC have a political dimension. Arbour 
argued that complementarity would favour rich developed countries against poor countries 
                                                 
17 Ruti Teitel, ‘Local Injustice: Why We Shouldn’t Forget about Saif Gaddafi’ (I.CONnect, 16 October 2012) 
<www.iconnectblog.com/2012/10/local-injustice-why-we-shouldnt-forget-about-saif-gaddafi/> 
accessed 9 January 2014. 
18 Mirjan Damaška, ‘What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ 2008 Chicago-Kent L Rev 329, 355-6. 
19 Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui (admissibility of the case against Katanga) ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8 Appeals 
Chamber (25 September 2009) (Katanga) Dissenting Opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert, paras 9-132. 
20 Catherine Gegout, ‘The International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and Conditions for the Promotion of 
Justice and Peace’ (2013) 34 Third World Q 800, 801. 
21 Steven C Roach, ‘Legitimising Negotiated Justice: The International Criminal Court and Flexible Governance’ 
(2013) 17 International Journal of Human Rights 619, 625. 
22 Cherie Boot ‘Prospects and issues for the International Criminal Court’ in Philippe Sands (ed) From Nuremberg 
to the Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (CUP 2003) 180. 
23 Brian Z Tamanaha ‘The History and Elements of the Rule of Law’ [2012] Sing JLS 232, 233. 
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because it would be difficult to demonstrate that a state with a sophisticated and functional 
justice system was ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’.24 The caseload of the Court to date demonstrates 
that it is more likely that the Court will prosecute nationals and situations from the least 
powerful states. All situations relate to African nations.25 However, and somewhat contrasting 
with the argument above, four of these – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central 
African Republic and Mali – have been based on self-referrals by national governments 
consistent with state sovereignty. As an instrument of global governance, the ICC directly 
applies international law.26 The development of an international rule of law is limited by the 
influence of the inequality of power within the institutions and mechanisms of international 
law, but the application of law by the ICC demonstrates many of the elements needed for an 
international rule of law. 
The ICC is simultaneously applying and developing the international rule of law. The 
jurisdiction of the ICC is established in the Rome Statute. Each decision of the Court applies 
the rule of law in making decisions on the basis of the Rome Statute and other applicable 
international law, also developing the international community’s understanding of international 
criminal law. Without the traditional enforcement mechanism of a police force, the Court’s 
contribution to the establishment of an international rule of law depends on the Court being 
perceived as a legitimate authority by its constituency which ‘hangs almost entirely on the 
quality of their decisions and their procedures’.27 
Through the application of the principle of the rule of law, the ICC creates norms of 
international criminal justice. Complementarity allows the Court to define these international 
standards of justice.28 For example, the ICC’s decisions provide guidance to domestic courts 
for prosecutorial standards required to prevent the ICC from determining that a matter is 
admissible to the Court. Ideally, the ICC will develop the standards of international criminal 
procedure to such an extent that national jurisdictions will be able to clearly identify and apply 
the standards that it demands in domestic trials of international crimes. 
It is an essential element of procedural justice that the accused receives a fair trial. 
Consideration of the accused’s access to legal representation in determining admissibility is 
                                                 
24 William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (CUP 2011) 196. 
25 Situations and cases (International Criminal Court) 
<http://icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx> 
accessed 7 August 2014. 
26 de Waart, Denters and Schrijver (n 8) 253.  
27 Damaška (n 18) 345. 
28 Eric Blumenson, ‘The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the 
International Criminal Court’ (2005) 44 Colum J Transnat’l L 801, 804-05. 
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consistent with the inherent powers of the court to provide procedural justice. As Gioia puts 
it: 
[I]f we assume that the Court is meant to serve as an international body complementing 
national jurisdictions ... for the most serious crimes by abiding by the highest 
international human rights standards, allowing the ICC to remedy the failures of 
national courts in complying with due process standards seems entirely consistent with 
this role.29 
c) Preventing impunity 
The Court, based on the preamble, has identified the aim of the Rome Statute as ‘to put an end 
to impunity’ and to ensure that ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished’.30 The establishment of the Court was a 
response to dissatisfaction with other methods of dealing with international criminals that had 
resulted in impunity, extrajudicial killing, or show trials.31 This links the establishment of the 
Court with the purpose of providing retributive justice. 
In relation to Gaddafi’s trial, the former ICC Prosecutor took the position that the 
emphasis on impunity did not require consideration of the accused’s rights. He stated ‘we [the 
ICC] are not a system to monitor fair trials. We are a system to ensure no impunity’.32 This 
approach is supported to some extent by consideration of the travaux préparatoires of the 
Rome Statute. Italy proposed a version of Article 17 that would have permitted the Court to 
consider whether ‘the said investigations or proceedings … were or are conducted with full 
respect for the fundamental rights of the accused’.33 Heller argues that rejection of the 
Italian proposal demonstrates that states did not want the ICC to function as a supranational court 
of human rights, imposing its own practices and procedures on national criminal justice 
systems.34 The Court agrees.35 However, the travaux préparatoires are merely a subsidiary 
source of treaty interpretation and other interpretations are possible.36 
In this case, the travaux préparatoires reflect disagreement between the Parties about 
whether the Court should take into consideration the rights of the accused. The Ad Hoc and 
                                                 
29 Gioia (n 9) 1100-1101. 
30 Katanga (n 19) para 79. 
31 Cryer and others (n 6) 23. 
32 Teitel, ‘Local Injustice: Why We Shouldn’t Forget about Saif Gaddafi’ (n 17). 
33 Draft Proposal by Italy, UN Doc A/AC.249/1997/WG.3/IP.4, 5 August 1997. 
34 Heller (n 11) 255, 272, 281. 
35 Al-Senussi Admissibility Appeal Decision (n 4) para 226. 
36 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 (VCLT), art 32. 
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Preparatory Committees provide evidence of state concerns about sovereignty, constitutional 
guarantees in domestic systems against double jeopardy, and the concerns of France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States that the ICC would function as a quasi-appellate court, passing 
judgments on the decisions and proceedings of national judicial systems.37 The Ad Hoc 
Committee envisioned this as being addressed by the Court making a case-by-case 
assessment. 38  Other states, including the sixty states of the Like Minded Group, were 
committed to giving the ICC the power to intervene where domestic proceedings were 
ineffective.39 
The failure of the Parties to agree to the explicit consideration of the availability of due 
process rights could be characterised as a deliberate lacuna for the purpose of achieving 
agreement.40 The Rome Statute was a product of compromise.41 Pursuit of a statute with the 
strongest protections for the accused would have attracted the opposition of a significant 
number of states, reducing the actual effectiveness of the Court.42 It is the role of the Court to 
settle disagreements, including disagreements unresolved in the Rome Statute.43 As a result, 
the Court has to fill the gap.44 
Even if the sole purpose of the ICC was to prevent impunity, this requires justice. 
Impunity is defined as ‘[e]xemption from punishment or freedom from the injurious 
consequences of an action’.45 The prevention of impunity is not facilitated by punishing those 
that are not guilty of an offense. Conviction of an accused who has not perpetrated a crime does 
not prevent impunity. If anything, it will promote impunity, as the true perpetrator is more 
                                                 
37 John T Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal Court: The 
Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer 1999) 41, 48; Ad Hoc Committee (n 2) para 43; ‘Report of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Court’ Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee 
during March-April and August 1996) United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Fiftieth Session 
(New York, 1995) (Preparatory Committee Vol I) UN Doc. A/51/22 paras 161, 172. 
38 Ad Hoc Committee (n 2) para 45. 
39 Sharon A Williams and William A Schabas ‘Article 17 Issues of Admissibility’ in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos 
(eds), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by 
Article (2nd edn, Hart 2008) 610; Philippe Kirsch and Darryl Robinson ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome 
Conference’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (OUP 2002) 69; Cryer and others (n 6) 147. 
40 Chester Brown, ‘The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals’ (2006) 76 BYIL 195, 202. 
41 Williams and Schabas (n 39) 625. 
42 Kirsch and Robinson (n 39) 87. 
43  Yuval Shany, ‘Part 1: The Concept of Jurisdiction and Admissibility in International Adjudication – a 
Theoretical Framework’ (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Cambridge, 28 February 2012) 
<www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/events/2012-lauterpacht-lectures-part-1-concept-jurisdiction-and-admissibility- 
international-adjudic> accessed 12 August 2014. 
44 Paola Gaeta, ‘Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals’ in Lal Chand Vohrah and others, Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man: essays on international law in honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer 2003) 
367. 
45 Oxford English Dictionary <www.oxforddictionaries.com> accessed 6 August 2014. 
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likely to remain unpunished. Access to legal representation is a safeguard that aims to prevent 
the accused from being unjustifiably punished. Consideration of access to legal representation 
in admissibility to the ICC will provide guidance to domestic courts about the prosecutorial 
standards for international crimes. Access to legal representation is a necessary element of 
justice that will contribute to the prevention of impunity. 
d) Deterrence 
The preamble links the prevention of impunity, deterrence and prevention by stating the 
intention of states ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes’.46 Cryer argues that the Rome Statute provides a 
limited role for deterrence and that it has been undermined in the past by an absence of 
enforcement and the small number of prosecutions by international criminal tribunals.47 
Despite this, the application of the rule of law to international crimes provides accountability 
that can offer some deterrent effect. The Prosecutor argues that the ICC has been an effective 
deterrent by triggering debate, mobilising the campaign for the release of child soldiers, 
increasing education, supporting structural reform, and influencing military operational 
standards.48 This has been described as the ‘shadow of the court’.49 The impact of the ‘shadow 
of the court’ depends on its legitimacy. 
A failure to consider the accused’s rights in the assessment of admissibility 
communicates a tolerance of national trials that do not provide a fair trial. This undermines 
legitimacy as it fails to provide determinacy, coherence and adherence to a standard of 
international criminal justice. 50  The system of international criminal justice becomes 
indeterminate and incoherent as different standards are applied by the different organs of 
implementation. This has the potential to promote injustice and to undermine the legitimacy of 
international criminal law and its deterrent function. If the ICC is viewed as illegitimate its 
‘shadow’ will have very little impact. 
e) Establishment of a Court 
Nouwen argues that the object and purpose of the Rome Statute is simply the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court, complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, and 
                                                 
46 Rome Statute (n 1) preamble; Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice’, para 1. 
47 Cryer and others (n 6) 27. 
48 Fatou Bensouda, ‘The Rome Statute Ten Years On: Where to from Here for the ICC?’ (Melbourne University 
Law School, 17 February 2011) <www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F02E8FEF-06B9-4D3E-BF9A- 
B5392EEFA304/0/MelbourneLawSchoollecture.pdf> accessed 6 August 2014, 7-9. 
49  Ban Ki-moon ‘Address to the Review Conference on the International Criminal Court: “An Age of 
Accountability”’ (Kampala, 31 May 2010) 
<www.un.org/sg/selected- speeches/statement_full.asp?statID=829> accessed 6 August 2014. 
50 Franck (n 14) 30-41. 
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to regulate the conduct of the Court and obligations of states. She states that the Statute’s object 
and purpose is not to be confused with ‘lofty aims’ in the preamble.51 Taking such a limited 
view separates the Court from its context and fails to consider the inherent functions of a court, 
one of which is the interpretation of applicable law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) makes context essential to interpretation, though it provides little guidance on 
whether to prioritise ordinary meaning, object and purpose, or context, or what meaning to give 
to these criteria.52 
The establishment of a court in itself is not an end; it does not achieve anything unless 
it takes actions relevant to its context. Courts have inherent powers to ensure the proper 
administration of justice consistent with their judicial functions.53 The preamble of the Rome 
Statute provides guidance on the function of the Court and thus the limits of its inherent 
powers.54 Nouwen argues that this is a misapplication of the preamble as it treats it as legal 
principle. On the contrary, the preamble addresses the ambiguity of complementarity 
consistently with the rules of interpretation that permit the use of the preamble to interpret the 
operative provisions of a treaty.55 
The ICC has three primary purposes: to function as a permanent international court, to 
provide international justice and apply the rule of law, and to prevent impunity and promote 
deterrence. To serve each of these purposes the Court must consider the accused’s rights. It is 
an inherent function of the Court to provide procedural justice. The accused’s rights safeguard 
retributive justice and justice for the victims by preventing the wrongfully accused from being 
punished. Accordingly, the rights of the accused are important not only for the accused’s sake 
but also because they safeguard justice as a value independent of the accused’s dignity. This is 
essential to ensuring punishment is legitimate. This impacts the effectiveness of the Court in 
preventing impunity, promoting deterrence, and the application of international criminal justice 
and rule of law. Without considerations of procedural justice, national proceedings that fail to 
respect the accused’s rights are just as faulty as those that seek to shield the accused, which 
undermines the legitimacy of international criminal justice. 
                                                 
51 Sarah M H Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan (CUP 2013) 39. 
52 VCLT (n 36) art 31, 32; Julian Mortenson, ‘The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to 
Drafting History?’ (2013) 107 AJIL 780 820; Yuval Shany, ‘Part 3: Questions of Admissibility before International 
Courts’ (Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Cambridge, 1 March 2012) <www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/events/2012-
lauterpacht-lectures-part-3-questions-admissibility-international-courts> accessed 12 August 2014. 
53 Brown (n 40) 237. 
54 Kleffner (n 8) 100. 
55 VCLT (n 36) art 31; Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (Judgment) 1950 ICJ Rep 266, 282; Rights of Nationals 
of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States) (Judgment) 1952 ICJ Rep 176, 196. 
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C. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
1. Does complementarity require consideration of the accused’s access to legal 
representation? 
Consideration of the object and purpose of the Rome Statute suggests that complementarity 
requires consideration of the accused’s rights because of their importance to ensuring justice. 
The language of the Rome Statute leaves several openings for the consideration of the 
accused’s rights in determining admissibility.56 These include the applicable law, consideration 
of ‘principles of due process recognized by international law’, ‘genuinely’ carrying out 
investigation and prosecution, independence and impartiality and ‘intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice’, ‘substantial collapse’ or ‘unavailability’ of the national judicial system. 
In using these opportunities the ICC needs to be cognisant of the implications of the imposition 
of judicial imperialism but also ensure the consistent development of higher standards of 
justice. 
a) Legal framework of complementarity 
The preamble of the Rome Statute emphasises the primary role of national measures in ending 
impunity, to be enhanced by international cooperation and complemented by the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. This is reasserted in Article 1, which states that the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to ‘the most 
serious crimes of international concern’.57 Complementarity recognised the legal situation 
prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute in which national courts were the only method 
of enforcement, and at times, deficient because of their failure to prevent impunity or provide 
justice.58 
Complementarity accommodated criminal jurisdiction as a core component of 
sovereignty and addressed the enforcement gap in domestic proceedings by conditioning 
admissibility to the ICC on whether a state is ‘unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the 
investigation or prosecution’. 59  A state is considered to be ‘unwilling’ to do so, if the 
proceedings were for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility, if there 
is an unjustified delay in the proceedings inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
                                                 
56 Yuval Shany, ‘Part 2: The Law Governing Jurisdictional Decision of International Courts’ (Hersch Lauterpacht 
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57 Rome Statute (n 1) art 1, 5. 
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concerned to justice, or if the proceedings were not conducted independently or impartially 
consistently with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.60 A state is considered 
‘unable’ if, ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, 
the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings’.61 
b) Purpose of complementarity 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute provides the criteria for determining when a case is inadmissible 
to the ICC. It assumes cases are admissible to the ICC. The Rome Statute preferences trials for 
international crimes and preventing impunity over state sovereignty. This is balanced against 
a structure that prioritises national jurisdictions that are willing and able.62 If states fulfil their 
obligations under international law by investigating and prosecuting international crimes, 
then the Court, recognising the primacy of national jurisdictions, cannot prosecute the case.63 
This balance recognises the sovereignty of states but allows the ICC to step in where necessary 
to prevent impunity, implement effective prosecutions, deter future crimes, and maintain the 
legitimacy of international criminal law.64 Though consideration of the rights of the accused 
are not explicitly included in Article 17, neither are they excluded. 
c) Applicable law: human rights in the Rome Statute 
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute states: ‘[t]he application and interpretation of law pursuant to 
this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights’. Within the 
application of the Rome Statute it creates a hierarchy of norms on the basis of subject matter. 
Article 21(1) sets out the formal sources of law that the Court will apply. These are the Rome 
Statute, Elements of Crimes and the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, applicable 
treaties, principles and rules of international law, and general principles of international legal 
systems. Subsection 3 subjects those sources to being applied and interpreted consistently 
with the subject matter of internationally recognised human rights law. In this sense, 
internationally recognised human rights law takes precedence.65 
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The Rome Statute does not define ‘internationally recognized human rights’.66 A 
starting point is the major international human rights treaties. All of those concerned with civil 
and political rights recognise the right of an accused individual to access legal 
representation.67 Further, standard rules of treaty interpretation require that complementarity 
be read consistently with a state’s other international obligations.68 Therefore, when the 
Court assesses whether a case is admissible, it should consider whether the state is complying 
with its international human rights obligations under customary international law, including 
the right to a fair trial.69 Consequently, consideration of ‘internationally recognized human 
rights’ includes procedural and substantive due process rights. 70  This ensures that the 
procedural availability of rights is not divorced from their purpose to effectively implement 
justice.71 This is supported by the Court in Lubanga, where it states that the application of 
internationally recognised human rights norms includes ‘the right to a fair trial, a concept 
broadly perceived and applied, embracing the judicial process in its entirety’.72 
Applying article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to admissibility, states must be willing and 
able to investigate or prosecute in compliance with internationally recognised human rights 
standards.73 Article 21(3) does not bind national jurisdictions but it does bind the ICC. The ICC 
must apply the criteria of admissibility consistent with ‘internationally recognized human 
rights’. In Al-Senussi, where the Court found the matter inadmissible, the Court recognised the 
significance of article 21(3). It held that international human rights law was not determinative 
of admissibility, balancing it against provisions of the preamble to ‘guarantee lasting respect 
for the enforcement of international justice’.74 
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The Rome Statute does not require a balancing act, but establishes international human 
rights law as overriding norms regarding the interpretation of the Rome Statute. In Al-Senussi, 
the Court held that ‘alleged violations of the accused’s procedural rights are not per se grounds 
for a finding of unwillingness or inability under article 17 of the statute’. 75  Al-Senussi 
substantiated that he had not had access to legal representation. 76  This was a breach of 
international human rights law. Article 21(3) means that the ICC was bound to interpret 
whether Libya was unwilling and unable in a way that was consistent with international human 
rights. In finding the case against Al-Senussi inadmissible despite the breach of ‘internationally 
recognized human rights’, the ICC has acted inconsistently with the Rome Statute. In assessing 
national proceedings, the ICC is bound to find proceedings that breach internationally 
recognised human rights law as admissible to the ICC. Accordingly, the Court’s findings in 
relation to admissibility were not consistent with the application of ‘internationally recognized 
human rights’, and were contrary to the binding hierarchy imposed on the interpretation and 
application of law under the Rome Statute by article 21(3).77 
d) Unwillingness 
i) Principles of due process recognised by international law 
The chapeau of article 17(2) of the Rome Statute obligates the Court to ‘have regard to the 
principles of due process recognized by international law’. In this way, the chapeau colours all 
assessments of unwillingness made by the Court, including whether a state is not genuinely 
investigating or prosecuting.78 In the Ad Hoc Committee some delegations questioned the 
appropriateness of the Court applying the principles and rules of international law, but 
ultimately the states parties consented to it.79 
The principles of due process recognised by international law can be adduced from 
custom, treaty, internationally recognised principles, and subsidiary sources.80 As identified 
above, these include the right to access legal representation. Consideration of the principles of 
due process recognised by international law provides greater certainty and somewhat reduces 
the subjectivity of the standard of ‘unwillingness’. It was introduced as an objective criterion.81 
Further, it is consistent with the object and purpose of the Rome Statute to provide justice, 
which requires respect for the accused’s rights. The Court reasserts the relevance of 
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international standards in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which state that the Court may 
consider internationally recognised norms and standards for impartial and independent 
prosecution of similar conduct.82 
In Al-Senussi, the Court limited the applicability of the ‘principles of due process 
recognized by international law’ by interpreting it in the context of article 17(2) (a) and (b), 
which focuses on situations of shielding and unjustified delay. The Court determined the 
purpose of the provision as preventing the accused from evading justice, which it equated with 
conviction.83 This is an unnecessarily limited view contrary to the explicit language of Article 
17(2). 
ii) Genuinely investigate and prosecute 
Article 17(1) provides that a case is admissible to the ICC where ‘the [s]tate is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution…’. The term ‘genuinely’ does 
not have a clear or objective meaning. This ambiguity of ‘genuinely’ provides a tool for the 
ICC to progressively integrate and develop higher international standards of access to legal 
representation, which will enhance the quality of justice provided by domestic jurisdictions. 
The uncertainty surrounding ‘genuinely’ makes the travaux préparatoires particularly 
relevant. ‘Genuinely’ must require an assessment of the investigation or prosecution, as a 
drafting suggestion that included no adjective was rejected by the drafting conference.84 At 
the Preparatory Committee it was observed that the International Law Commission draft article 
on admissibility, which made situations under investigation inadmissible, did not take into 
account the circumstances of the investigation or the possibility of ineffective or unavailable 
procedures or sham proceedings.85  The Preparatory Committee considered that ‘genuinely’ 
should take into account the circumstances under which a crime was investigated and the 
possibilities of ineffective or unavailable procedures.86 
Delegations to the Rome Statute Conference rejected ‘ineffective’, ‘good faith’, 
‘diligently’, and ‘sufficient grounds’. ‘Genuinely’ sought to balance concerns that the Court 
would consider itself better able to prosecute and investigate than domestic courts and that, if 
left to their own devices, domestic courts might commit travesties of justice in the name of 
international criminal law. ‘Genuinely’ was considered the least subjective because it 
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excluded elements of efficiency, while at the same time was more precise than ‘sufficient’ or 
‘reasonable grounds’.87 The drafters intended to ensure that international crimes would be 
effectively prosecuted and punished by states, and that ‘genuine’ seemed more neutral than 
‘effective’ or ‘efficient’. 88 The ambiguity of ‘genuinely’ allowed the Rome Statute 
delegation to achieve broad consensus.89 
Attempts by the delegation to introduce objective criteria failed because the language of 
the Rome Statute connects genuineness to the criteria of unwillingness and inability. This 
requires the Court to make an objective assessment of the inherently subjective intentions of 
the domestic jurisdiction.90 To the extent that an objective assessment can be made, this is 
introduced by interpreting ‘genuinely’ in the context of the ‘principles of due process 
recognized by international law’.91 In this way, international law has an objective standard of 
due process rights that can be assessed by the ICC. 
Heller argues that ‘genuinely’ does not provide an opening for consideration of the 
accused’s access to legal representation. He further suggests that a limited approach to the 
interpretation of ‘genuinely’ is supported by the drafting of the Rome Statute that provides 
detail on the meaning of ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ in article 17(2) and (3). These provisions 
focus on situations where an accused will not be tried, which Heller asserts sets the 
parameters for the interpretation of ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ .92 Even if this is the case, the 
language of article 17(2) and (3) leaves several openings for the consideration of the accused’s 
rights. 
In Al-Senussi, the Court took a narrow view of the requirement of ‘genuinely’. It held 
that ‘genuinely’ required the taking of ‘concrete and progressive investigative steps’ to 
‘ascertain whether the person is responsible for the conduct alleged against him’ which may 
include ‘interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out 
forensic analyses’.93 The Court took a subjective approach in determining the requirements of 
‘genuinely’ and failed to utilise the objective standard that is presented in article 17(2) of the 
‘principles of due process recognized by international law’. 
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iii) Independence, impartiality and ‘ inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice’ 
Where the domestic jurisdiction does not uphold the accused’s rights to access legal 
representation the proceedings are not being conducted in accordance with these principles. 
Independence primarily relates to institutional guarantees that ensure judges are independent 
from the executive and the legislature.94 In contrast, ‘impartiality implies that judges must 
not harbour preconceptions about the matter put before them, and that they must not act in 
ways that promote the interests of one of the parties’. 95 If the domestic jurisdiction does 
not, in substance, ensure the accused has the right to access legal representation, it suggests 
a lack of independence, and will inhibit the ability of judges to act impartially. 
The Preparatory Committee suggested that this aspect of unwillingness was included 
to address procedural problems that did not amount to shielding the accused person from being 
investigated or prosecuted. The purpose of the phrase ‘inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice’ was, it is suggested, in order to prevent impunity where there were 
insufficient institutional safeguards to ensure the independence of the judiciary to convict, or 
where the context of the crimes meant that the domestic judiciary would be unable to come to 
the case without any preconceptions favouring the accused. This is supported by the other 
elements of unwillingness; unjustified delay, and shielding.96 ‘[I]nconsistent with an intent to 
bring to justice’ has a broader application to the protection of the accused’s rights in situations 
where the domestic jurisdiction is too enthusiastic to prosecute. This approach is consistent 
with the plain meaning of the text, the object and purpose of the ICC to prevent impunity and 
provide justice, and ensuring that the court maintains its own legitimacy and that of 
international criminal law. 
The phrase ‘to bring the person concerned to justice’ implies consideration of the 
accused’s rights.97 This is especially true when ‘bringing to justice’ is understood to mean that 
responsible individuals, and only responsible individuals, are punished. Access to legal 
representation ensures fairness for the accused and therefore is an essential element of any 
system of justice. In Lubanga the Court stated ‘[a] fair trial is the only means to do justice. If 
no fair trial can be held, the object of the judicial process is frustrated and must be stopped’.98 
Consideration of the accused’s access to legal representation is a safeguard for the accused 
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from being punished for offences they did not commit. If intervention by the Court were limited 
to violations of independence and impartiality that only benefited the accused, it ‘would be 
tantamount to frustrating the very objective underlying the reference to “principles of due 
process recognized by international law”’.99 
The Court could develop this basis for consideration of the accused’s rights by taking 
into account whether the proceedings are typical to the usual state of practice relating to the 
investigation and prosecution of serious criminal cases in the state in question.100 The Court 
would need to look beyond the procedural availability of due process rights to consider 
whether they are substantively available in the particular case. This approach balances the 
interests of justice and state sovereignty. 
Kleffner and Nouwen argue that consideration of due process rights goes beyond the 
ordinary meaning of ‘to bring someone to justice’.101 They argue its meaning is limited to 
arresting and trying someone in a court, based on the dictionary definition, whereas the phrase 
‘to do justice to someone’ would imply a concern for the fairness of the proceedings.102 This is 
a limited view of the meaning of justice which does not consider that both retributive justice 
and justice for victims require procedural justice. A trial that is not fair does not provide any 
meaningful form of justice, merely emotional satisfaction that someone, regardless of 
their responsibility, has been tried. Such a trial is as illegitimate as a trial that seeks to shield 
the accused and has the further potential to undermine fragile peace in societies divided by 
conflict.103 
Nouwen further submits that considering due process rights in relation to admissibility 
would render the requirements of article 17(2)(b) and (c) – unjustified delay and a lack of 
independence or impartiality – redundant, as they would be examples of inconsistency with an 
intent to bring to justice in a fair manner. Considering article 17(2) as a whole, she argues 
that it is an exhaustive rather than illustrative list of permissible considerations and that 
if it was intended as an illustrative list, this would be explicit.104 However, Nouwen’s claim 
that her approach is supported by the travaux préparatoires is unsubstantiated as they merely 
show the disagreement between the Parties. The only agreement illustrated by the travaux is 
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that the Parties thought the criteria should be clearly defined.105 In contrast to Nouwen’s 
suggestions, Robinson argues that article 17(2)(b) was intentionally drafted with the open 
language of ‘shall consider whether’ suggesting that the Court may consider these factors, but 
not limiting any consideration to these factors.106 Applying Nouwen’s approach ignores the 
impact that a lack of legal representation can have on the independence and impartiality of a 
trial. Further a broader reading expands the deterrent effect.107 Such substantive considerations 
are more persuasive in light of the ICC’s purpose to provide justice. 
In Gaddafi, the Court found that despite procedural guarantees of legal representation, 
in substance these were not being met, which in part justified admissibility to the ICC.108 In 
Al-Senussi, the Court failed to consider the substantive violations of procedural guarantees to 
legal representation finding that the case was inadmissible to the ICC. Such conflicting 
decisions undermine the legitimacy of international criminal law by failing to provide a clear 
and general application of the law. 109 Despite the factual similarities, the law applied is 
conflicting.110 
In Al-Senussi the Court stated that where ‘violations of the rights of the suspect are so 
egregious that the proceedings can no longer be regarded as being capable of providing any 
genuine form of justice to the suspect … they should be deemed, in those circumstances, to be 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to justice”’.111 The Court held, in this context, 
that a lack of access to legal representation did not meet the threshold. The Court applied a 
high threshold for the consideration of the accused’s rights by characterising a state’s 
challenge to admissibility to the ICC as ‘primarily a question of forum’ focused on ‘the 
relationship between [s]tates and the Court...’112 By characterising the dispute as one between 
states and the Court, the Court made a distinction between procedure and substance that 
allowed it to focus on whether Al-Senussi had a procedural right to legal representation, as 
opposed whether this right would be fulfilled in substance. The decision of the Court has 
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significance for Al-Senussi as an individual. A lack of access to legal representation is so 
egregious that it results in no form of justice for the accused because of the important role 
access to legal advice plays in ensuring that the accused’s rights are respected and that their 
case is adequately presented. 
Many argue that the Court is not a human rights body, because there is nothing in the 
Rome Statute to make the Court responsible for the protection of the accused’s rights in the 
national enforcement of international criminal law, and that this is properly addressed by 
human rights treaties and bodies.113 The Court has held that if this was the purpose, it would 
expect it to be explicit.114 Limiting the consideration of the accused’s rights in this way 
perpetuates injustice contrary to the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Whether the 
accused has had access to legal representation in the first instance is an objective standard which 
the Court could easily make a finding on. As the right develops, the Court may be faced with 
the more challenging question of adjudicating substantively on the extent of access required to 
provide a sufficiently fair trial. In Al-Senussi, the Appeal Chamber took a limited view of 
complementarity that emphasised its role in preventing states from facilitating impunity.115 
This equates justice with conviction, undermining international criminal justice, contrary to 
the Court’s construction of justice as not always resulting in conviction.116 Further, the Court 
suggested that if the unavailability of due process rights did reach the threshold of warranting 
admissibility to the ICC, it was open to the Prosecutor to seek review of the Court’s decision 
pursuant to article 19(10).117 In effect, the Court is turning the Prosecutor into a human rights 
monitoring body, contrary to its purpose. 
Though human rights treaties and bodies are best placed to address human rights 
violations in the national enforcement context, the ICC’s purpose is to prevent impunity for 
international crimes within a system of international criminal justice. Failing to consider the 
accused’s rights in domestic processes implements an arbitrary distinction that threatens the 
integrity of the international criminal legal regime. In sum, the ICC should consider the 
accused’s human rights; the reason for this is not primarily that they are human rights, but that 
their content contributes to fulfilling the purpose of the Court. 
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e) Inability 
A state is unable where ‘due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of a national 
judicial system the [s]tate is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and 
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’.118 In the present context, this raises 
two questions. Firstly, has a national judicial system totally or substantially collapsed if it fails 
to provide the accused with access to legal representation? Secondly, is a national judicial 
system unavailable if the accused does not have access to legal representation? 
The additional criterion of the inability to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence 
and testimony clarify the meaning of ‘total or substantial collapse’ and unavailability of a 
national judicial system. To prevent the additional criterion from being too restrictive a 
reference to a state being ‘otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’ was included. It was 
necessary to retain some subjectivity to give the Court latitude to base a finding of 
unwillingness.119 Though ‘otherwise unavailable’ does not explicitly refer to considerations 
of the accused’s rights, it opens the door for their consideration.120 
i) Total or substantial collapse of a judicial system 
‘[T]otal or substantial collapse’ establishes a threshold for admissibility to the ICC. Collapse is 
a situation in which the state cannot fulfil its obligation to investigate or prosecute.121 The 
Rome Statute Conference rejected ‘partial collapse’ as insufficient to determine inability.122 
The threshold of ‘total or substantial collapse’ sought to balance state sovereignty against 
prevention of impunity and justice. It prevents undue ICC intervention in a judicial system. 
In Al-Senussi, the Court relied on evidence that the state had control of the detention 
facility, judicial proceedings were ongoing, and that hearings were taking place to find that 
there was not a state of total of substantial collapse of a judicial system. 123  This limited 
interpretation of ‘total or substantial collapse’ undermines the purpose of the Court to provide 
justice. National judicial systems that do not ensure access to legal representation are unable 
to deliver justice and are in ‘a state of total or substantial collapse’. This interpretation is open 
to the Court on the ordinary meaning of ‘otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’ and 
supports the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. O’Donohue and Rigney identify that ‘[f]air 
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trial concerns are ... a symptom of a substantially collapsed justice system...’124 To meet the 
threshold of total or substantial collapse the violations of the accused’s rights would have to be 
significant, as opposed to merely not meeting the standards of due process required in the Rome 
Statute.125 This is consistent with the intention that the jurisdiction of the Court would be 
exceptional.126 
ii) Unavailability 
Whether a national judicial system is unavailable is also assessed on the additional criterion of 
‘otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’.127 Kleffner argues that ‘unavailability’ 
suggests that the state’s national judicial system must constitute a bar to carrying out the 
proceedings and that due process rights merely relate to the way proceedings are carried out.128 
In contrast, Nouwen argues that not only practical circumstances but also normative factors 
can render a system genuinely ‘unavailable’ to conduct proceedings.129 The availability of due 
process rights is a normative concern of judicial proceedings. Due process rights, that provide 
procedural justice, allow the Court (or any judicial institution) to achieve, in substance, 
retributive justice and justice for victims.130 Providing justice is an inherent function of the 
Court that safeguards its judicial character.131 O’Donohue and Rigney argue that ‘fair trial 
concerns can render the justice system unavailable to the accused who relies on the fairness of 
the proceedings to establish their guilt or innocence.’132 This interpretation is consistent with the 
object and purpose of the Rome Statute to prevent impunity and provide justice. 
Due process rights are relevant where deficiencies in a national investigation or 
prosecution make it more difficult to convict a suspect because the state’s own criminal justice 
system requires due process.133 For example, Libya’s Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly 
guarantees the right to legal representation. Breaches may result in the Libyan national judicial 
system being unavailable. Allowing admissibility to the ICC where the accused’s rights are 
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violated would balance the interest in preventing impunity and would require evidence that 
meets international standards of due process. Relevantly, in Gaddafi, the Court found that the 
case was admissible, partly, because Libya was ‘otherwise unable’, as Gaddafi did not have 
access to legal representation.134 Here, the accused’s rights were relevant. In contrast, in Al-
Senussi, the Court considered the procedural rights provided in Libya’s Code of Criminal 
Procedure acceptable protection in relation to the preliminary stage of the investigation.135 The 
Libyan government made the same assertions about efforts to obtain legal counsel for both 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi.136 In Al-Senussi, the Court failed to lift the veil of procedure and 
consider the substantive practice of the state. Such inconsistency undermines the international 
criminal legal regime.137 
f) Summary 
There are a number of options when it comes to the ICC’s considering the accused’s rights to 
access to legal representation in admissibility determinations. All of these facilitate the purpose 
of the ICC to prevent impunity, implement justice, and apply principles of the rule of law. 
Article 21(3) makes internationally recognised human rights law a binding norm on the 
interpretation of the Rome Statute and is consistent with states’ other human rights obligations. 
‘Genuinely’ is sufficiently ambiguous to allow discretion to the Court to consider the 
availability of the accused’s rights. A lack of legal representation may prevent proceedings 
from being independent or impartial and be inconsistent with an intent to bring the accused to 
justice because the accused does not have the safeguards that prevent wrongful punishment 
and may prevent the Court from being fully informed of all the facts and arguments. 
Consideration of the availability of the accused’s rights requires the Court to consider the 
substantive availability of the rights to ensure the coherent and legitimate development of 
international criminal law. In defining ‘unable’, states gave the Court discretion to consider 
whether a domestic jurisdiction was ‘otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’. This 
creates an opening for normative considerations including the accused’s rights. Failure to 
provide due process rights may prevent a domestic court from providing justice which should 
be considered ‘a state of total or substantial collapse’. A lack of due process rights can render 
a domestic court unavailable to the accused as it may not be able to provide the accused with 
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justice. It is open to the Court to consider the availability of due process rights in determining 
admissibility to the ICC. 
2. Does consideration of the accused’s access to legal representation undermine the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the ICC? 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of an international court are not solely determined by 
providing justice. By upholding an international standard of due process rights, the ICC runs 
the risk of being criticised for judicial imperialism. If the ICC is, or is perceived to be, an 
instrument of political power, it undermines its legitimacy and effectiveness as a judicial organ. 
This may provide impetus for states to refuse to cooperate with the ICC. Further, an overzealous 
approach to due process rights has the potential to undermine the value of local justice, the 
reconstruction of domestic rule of law, and reconciliation. However, providing due process 
rights is essential for these issues to be addressed by domestic jurisdictions. It is the legitimate 
role of the Court to address the lacunae of the Rome Statute by establishing higher standards 
of access to legal representation.138 It is the role of the Court to create a space for interaction 
between the Parties to create a practice of legality that develops the standards of 
admissibility.139 
a) Judicial imperialism 
Consideration of the accused’s access to legal representation in determining admissibility to 
the ICC will result in an assessment by the Court of each particular case.140 The 
intervention of international criminal law in national jurisdictions is justified on the basis that 
it lifts the proceedings out of a political context. International trials have the advantage of 
international standards and forums that are more likely to uphold the rule of law and satisfy 
fairness and impartiality concerns.141 However, the political nature of referrals to the ICC can 
give rise to the appearance of judicial imperialism. Furthermore, the ICC’s dependency on 
the support of powerful states can result in the Prosecutor’s powers only being used against 
weak states.142 Though designed as an independent office, it is likely that the Prosecutor will 
exercise its functions in a way that sustains support for the institution from the most powerful 
states. Even when the prosecutor opens a preliminary investigation into a more powerful state, 
such as that of the British forces in Iraq,143 it is highly unlikely that this will ever reach 
                                                 
138 Gaeta (n 44) 367. 
139 Brunnée and Toope (n 109) 5, 6, 353. 
140 Al-Senussi Admissibility Appeal Decision (n 34; Gaddafi Admissibility Appeal Decision (n 13). 
141 Ruti G Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2000) 33. 
142 Nouwen (n 51) 14. 
143 ‘Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Re-Opens the Preliminary Examination of the 
Situation in Iraq’ (International Criminal Court, 13 May 2014) 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
323 
prosecution because of the sophisticated judicial system in the United Kingdom. A closer 
look at the cases before the ICC and how they came about reveals the following picture. 
The cases of Darfur and Libya have been triggered by United Nations Security Council 
referral.144 Neither Sudan nor Libya are parties to the Rome Statute. Three of the five members 
of the Security Council – the United States, Russia, and China – are notp Parties to, or have 
not ratified, the Rome Statute.145 Security Council resolutions are inherently political and 
reflect existing power structures.146 Sudan has refused to cooperate with the ICC, preventing 
investigation and prosecution. The situations in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire were triggered by the 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.147 Libya and Kenya have opposed admissibility to the ICC, 
citing consent as the basis of the Court’s legitimacy.148 
In addition to those cases mentioned so far, the contrasting decisions in Gaddafi and 
Al-Senussi leave the Court open to criticism that it is applying the law in a way that is 
inconsistent with the basic principle that cases that are the same should have the same result.149 
After the decision in Gaddafi, the African Union (AU) declared that it would hold a summit 
on the withdrawal of African states from the ICC.150 On 11 October 2013, the ICC held that the 
case against Al-Senussi was inadmissible. On 12 October, at the AU Summit, the AU declared 
its concerns about the politicisation and misuse of indictments against African leaders by the 
ICC.151 To date, no African state has withdrawn from the ICC. The AU’s response to the ICC’s 
focus on Africa demonstrates that ‘[i]nternational criminal justice … cannot enjoy long-term 
credibility if it becomes an instrument of hegemony for powerful [s]tates’.152 If the ICC is 
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viewed as an instrument of power rather than justice it will not be viewed as legitimate by 
states parties.153 This has the potential to result in their withdrawal.154 
Damaška highlights that even where the Court disproportionately prosecutes weak 
nations, ‘international criminal courts contribute to the emergence of a moral climate in which 
even big and powerful actors in the international arena find it increasingly difficult to ignore 
their verbal commitments.’155 It is arguable, and has at times been perceived, that investigations 
and prosecutions of the Court are not politically neutral. Despite this, the Court has a normative 
impact on the behaviour of all states.156 Still, the regional imbalance in prosecutions has created 
a perception of illegitimacy. 
Without the cooperation of states or consent to its jurisdiction, the ICC cannot 
function. 157  In cases like Al-Senussi, where the state is clearly willing to prosecute the 
accused, the ICC has considered the perceived legitimacy of the Court in focusing on the 
procedural rather than substantive access to legal representation. Here, the Court walks a 
tightrope between its legitimacy to states parties, its legitimacy as a judicial organ and its 
effectiveness. 
b) The value of local justice 
If the ICC required states to have in place due process rights equivalent to the Rome Statute for 
a matter to be inadmissible to the ICC, it would have the potential to undermine the value of 
local justice. Domestic criminal prosecutions conducted within post-conflict societies are 
presumed to contribute to societal reconstruction and the transition to peace by consolidating 
trust in the national judiciary and rule of law, diminishing the risk of vigilante justice and 
general scepticism towards the political system and giving societies ownership of the justice 
process.158 If the ICC determines that a lack of due process rights makes a matter admissible 
to the ICC, the ability of domestic trials to play this role is limited. These were potentially 
underlying policy considerations in Al-Senussi. Transitional justice relies on a pragmatic 
normative construction of the new political regime. Criminal sanctions in the transitional 
context seek to address the illegitimacy of the past rule. 
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Teitel argues that this may justify moving outside the law to address past injustices.159 
If the ICC ignores violations of the accused’s rights it can contribute to it becoming a feature 
of the new political order.160 The Rome Statute gives the ICC the mandate to move states in a 
hegemonic direction in determining how to address the prosecution of crimes within its 
jurisdiction.161 The Court can achieve this without undermining states parties’ sovereignty 
through complementarity. Complementarity requires states to have the shared objective of 
effective prosecution.162 The Court could take a pluralist approach that is tolerant of different 
types of conduct but does not validate any and all conduct.163 This approach promotes 
autonomy, facilitates communication, and protects diversity.164 
States should be required to provide a right to access legal representation. In cases 
where the accused has no or an extremely limited right to access legal representation, there is 
a clear violation that the Court should remedy through admissibility. Such a decision protects 
the comprehensive judicial character of the Court, the legitimacy of international law and the 
development of rule of law in transitional societies.165 
By upholding international standards of due process, the ICC has the potential to induce 
higher standards in domestic judicial institutions, to the detriment of the benefits that can be 
derived from the experience of transitional justice.166 International criminal law and procedure 
can fulfil a mediating role in transitional justice as it remains intact despite the collapse of the 
domestic jurisdiction, has the capacity to comprehend extraordinary violence, and is well 
suited to express the transitional message of a normative shift.167 The Court must balance the 
value of local justice to reconstruction and reconciliation against the international community’s 
interest in preventing impunity and the development of an international rule of law in each 
context.168 
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Where a state is overly willing to prosecute, to the extent that there is no possibility of 
providing any genuine form of justice, permitting domestic prosecution undermines 
international and domestic rule of law. Such trials contribute to the normative construction of 
a domestic and international political regime that fails to respect rights. This undermines both 
domestic and international justice because of the important role that legal representation plays 
in ensuring procedural justice. The risk for the Court is that it will provide conflicting decisions 
that will undermine international rule of law and its own legitimacy, as occurred in the Gaddafi 
and Al-Senussi decisions.169 
c) Development of an international standard of justice 
Legitimacy and effectiveness cannot be divorced as an ineffective court may lose legitimacy 
and vice versa. A court must retain a minimum level of legitimacy and effectiveness to 
be operational. If a court does not meet minimum standards of legitimacy and effectiveness, 
matters will not be referred to it for determination, nor will its judgments be enforced. 170 
The implementation of an international standard of due process rights in domestic proceedings 
would address these concerns and fulfil the previous Prosecutor’s vision of success: ‘the 
absence of trials before … [the] Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national 
institutions…’.171 
The ICC provides a forum for the development of shared understandings and the 
development of a practice of legality that implements interactional international law. 172 
Pursuant to the Rome Statute, states parties have agreed that those responsible for the most 
serious international crimes should be tried where states are unwilling and unable to do so. The 
parties left a lacuna in terms of what ‘unwilling’ and ‘unable’ mean, that the Court is required 
to fill. Using the consideration of the rights of the accused to fill this lacuna is justified by the 
purpose of the Court and the language of article 17. Through its judgments, the Court signals 
to states parties what actions are required for their courts to be considered willing and able to 
try those accused of international crimes. If states seek to avoid matters being removed from 
domestic jurisdiction and admitted to the ICC, they will implement the standards used by the 
ICC to determine admissibility. A shared understanding is developed through states’ further 
                                                 
169 Al-Senussi Admissibility Appeal Decision (n 4) Separate Opinion of Judge Ušacka para 15; Shany, ‘Part 3: 
Questions of Admissibility before International Courts’ (n 52). 
170 Shany, ‘Part 2: The Law Governing Jurisdictional Decision of International Courts’ (n 56). 
171 Luis Moreno-Ocampo ‘Ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court’ 16 June 2003.  
172 Al-Senussi Admissibility Appeal Decision (n 4) Separate Opinion of Judge Ušacka para 9; Prosecutor v Ruto et 
al (Decision on Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article I9(2)(b) of the Statute) (20 September 2011) 
ICC-01/09-01/11-336 (OA) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ušacka para 19. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
327 
interactions with the Court. Specifically, in the context of the ICC, this shared understanding 
is developed through subsequent referral of matters by states, the Security Council and 
individuals to the Court. This signals acceptance of the continuing authority of the ICC. 
If the Court does not consider the accused’s rights, it misses an opportunity to develop 
the law and creates a sense of hypocrisy that damages commitment to the rule of law.173 The 
implementation of static law that disregards context will detract from the development of a 
shared understanding that contributes to the legitimacy of international law.174 Failure to 
consider the availability of due process rights or providing conflicting decisions undermines 
the judicial function of the Court. International legal obligations are effective when the norms 
of international law apply the criteria of legality to practice. Consideration of access to legal 
representation is relevant to maintaining the consistency, congruence, and non-contradiction 
of judicial function in international law. Ignoring key safeguards of the judicial process 
undermines certainty and detracts from the practice of legality and sense of legal obligation of 
states to uphold the accused’s rights.175 In the context of international criminal law, it is likely 
to be more difficult for states to uphold their international human rights obligations. The 
consideration of the accused’s rights in admissibility to the ICC provides a further possible 
enforcement mechanism. 
Imposing the standard of due process rights provided in the Rome Statute would have 
a disproportionately detrimental impact on the legitimacy of the ICC. It would reinforce claims 
of judicial imperialism and undermine reconstruction. The Court should initially hold states to 
their existing human rights obligations and the principle of due process recognised by 
international law to provide access to legal representation. At the same time, the Court should 
accept a plurality of models regarding the form this access may take. Such an approach would 
establish a base standard that could be developed through the jurisprudence of the ICC as a 
forum of interaction to enhance the shared understanding that forms the basis of legal 
legitimacy. 
As an organ applying international law, the ICC is caught in a tension between the 
application of law and politics. In contrast to a domestic court, it has to consider its legitimacy 
as perceived by sovereign states, as it depends on them for its effective operation. Maintaining 
this support can undermine the rule of law.176 Cynics will see this as a failure of the Court. 
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However, this fails to recognise that the Court is in a developmental stage and that the 
international community has taken a great leap towards the implementation of international 
rule of law in the establishment of the ICC.177 To maintain legitimacy, the Court cannot take 
an overzealous approach to ensuring that the accused has access to legal representation, but 
must rather take a pluralist approach that accepts that access may take varied forms. It must 
also set progressively evolving minimum standards. This is not ideal from a rule of law 
perspective but will hopefully achieve the final objective of the implementation of an 
international standard of access to legal representation in domestic courts. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The establishment of a permanent international court, the prevention of impunity and 
promotion of deterrence, and the establishment of international justice and rule of law require 
that the ICC is perceived as a legitimate institution of international law. The ICC will not 
prevent impunity or be a deterrent if it is not considered to provide procedural justice. If the 
ICC does not consider the accused’s rights at a domestic level in determining admissibility it 
will not provide retributive justice or justice for victims, because access to legal representation 
is essential to ensuring that the accused is not wrongly convicted. The ICC must consider the 
accused’s rights in determining admissibility; when domestic courts prosecute international 
crimes they act as agents of international criminal law. Failure to consider the accused’s rights 
undermines the legitimacy of international criminal justice. 
The text of the Rome Statute provides openings for the Court to consider the availability 
of due process rights in determining admissibility. The Court is required to apply the Rome 
Statute consistently with international human rights law. The requirement that investigations 
and prosecutions are genuine provides an ambiguous criterion that allows the Court to make an 
assessment of domestic investigations and prosecutions. Unwillingness is to be assessed in 
light of the ‘principles of due process recognized by international law’ and in a manner ‘not 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice’, which requires access to 
legal representation. ‘Unable’ includes whether ‘due to a total or substantial collapse of the 
national judicial system, the state is otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings’. Violations 
of the accused’s access to legal representation represents a substantial collapse of a legal 
system, as it is essential to ensuring the legitimacy of a court. Violations of the accused’s rights 
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makes a court ‘otherwise unable’ to prosecute, as protection of the accused’s rights is an 
inherent function of a court. Finally, the Court may consider that a domestic court is 
unavailable to the accused where it does not provide access to legal representation as this is not 
legitimately fulfilling its purpose of providing a fair trial. Considering the accused’s rights is 
consistent with the overarching purpose of the ICC to provide international justice. 
If the ICC takes an assertive role in determining cases as admissible based on violations 
of the accused’s rights at the domestic level, it may face challenges to its legitimacy. These 
challenges include claims of judicial imperialism and of undermining local justice and 
undermine the effectiveness of the Court as States may withdraw from the Rome Statute or 
refuse to cooperate – which may have the same effect, given the ICC’s reliance on state 
cooperation for implementation and enforcement. Removing cases from domestic courts 
potentially deprives the local community of the opportunity to strengthen domestic rule of law 
and facilitate reconciliation. Creating a system where some accused of international crimes 
have access to the highest standard of due process rights and others do not has the potential to 
create two (or several) standards of justice breeding injustice. The Court must be aware of the 
context it operates within to maintain its legitimacy and effectiveness. The Court should not 
insist that domestic jurisdictions provide the same level of due process rights as provided in 
the Rome Statute, but should take a pluralist approach that ensures basic standards are met. As 
the international criminal legal system develops, the ICC should give greater weight to 
considerations of access to legal representation and hold States to a higher standard of 
international criminal justice. 
